Recent Developments in the Law
Vol. No. XXXVIII
June 22, 2000
In order to keep you abreast of the recent developments in the law, we are reporting the substance of several current decisions of major import in the jurisdictions of Maryland, the District of Columbia and Virginia.
This material is being provided for your general information only, and is not a substitute for obtaining legal advice. The information provided is not provided as legal advice, or in the course of an attorney-client relationship. You should always consult an attorney for advice about the specific circumstances of your case.
AN INTENTIONAL TORT IS AN "ACCIDENT" UNDER THE TERMS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IF THE VICTIM COULD NOT FORESEE THE OCCURRENCE OF THE TORT
In Cole v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an accident is an event that is unexpected or not foreseen, and the court should view the event through the eyes of the victim in an intentional tort case.
Eddie Jackson Cole and Sharyn Cole were shot by William Dawson Cave, who was the father of Mr. Cole's first wife. Ms. Cole was shot in the family van with the engine idling, and later died from her injuries. Mr. Cole filed with his insurance company to pay for the death of Ms. Cole under their automobile insurance policy. State Farm refused coverage stating that the Ms. Cole's death was caused by the independent acts of Mr. Cave and did not fall within the meaning of "accident" in the policy.
Mr. Cole filed a breach of contract case against State Farm. Mr. Cole later filed a Motion for Summary Judgment stating that coverage was proper because his wife did not expect to be shot while seated in the van and, thereby, it was an accident. In opposition to the motion State Farm argued that a causal connection must exist between use of the van and Ms. Cole's death. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm ruling that the event was not an accident.
The Court of Special affirmed the ruling and held that the cause of Ms. Cole's injuries must be related to the use of the automobile to recover from the policy. The Court of Special Appeals further held that unforseeability must be determined through Mr. Cave's eyes to determine if the incident was an accident.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals. The Court held that the commission of an intentional tort does not bar an act from being an accident if it was unforeseen or unexpected. The Court stated that unforeseeability should be judged from Ms. Cole's point of view.
A two part test was applied by the court to determine if Ms. Cole had foreseen the incident. The first question was whether the insured expected an attack or not. The second question is whether a reasonable person with the same knowledge and experience would have expected an attack. The Court of Appeals answered both questions in the negative and held that Ms. Cole's death was caused by an accident. Cole v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 2000 WL 764759 (Md. June 14, 2000).
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT, IN AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE, THE EMPLOYEE NEED ONLY PRESENT EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE JURY WITH A RATIONAL BASIS FOR DISBELIEVING THE EMPLOYERS RATIONALE FOR TERMINATION.
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff, who alleges age discrimination by his employer under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), need only present a prima facie case of discrimination and evidence that provides the jury with a rational basis to refute the employers justification for termination.
This case arose out of a complaint by Roger Reeves that his employment was terminated at Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. based on his age in Violation of the ADEA. Mr. Reeves was a supervisor for the regular line in the Hinge Department and he reported directly to Russell Caldwell. Mr. Caldwell reported to the company management that production was behind due to irregular attendance of employees and disciple could not be taken because attendance reports had been altered to hide tardiness and early departures. The company investigated the matter. It was recommended that Mr. Reeves and Mr. Caldwell be terminated and both were terminated.
Mr. Reeves brought suit for violation of the ADEA based on statements made by Powe Chestnut, who made the termination recommendation to his wife the company president, made comments at different times regarding Mr. Reeves' age. The company defended its actions by stating the reason for Mr. Reeves termination was improper attendance record keeping. Mr. Reeves presented evidence that his records were accurate and that Mr. Chestnut had been unfair to him and other employees. The trial court refused to grant the defendants' two motions for judgement as a matter of law. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth District reversed the trial court's ruling. The court held his evidence may show that the company's explanation for his termination was a pretext to discrimination; however, he did not prove that there was discrimination because Mr. Chestnut's comments were not made in connection with Mr. Reeves' termination.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision. The Court held that the same framework for proving Title VII claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would apply to ADEA claims. That framework being that a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, then the defendant must present evidence to show a nondiscriminatory basis for the termination.
The Court found that Mr. Reeves met his first burden by showing that he fell into the class that was protected by the ADEA, he was qualified for his position, he was discharged by the company, and three younger individuals filled his position. Sanderson satisfied its burden by showing that the reason for Mr. Reeves' termination was his failure to maintain accurate attendance records.
The Court further held that, although the employer satisfies its burden to disprove the presumption of discrimination, the jury can consider evidence that was presented by the plaintiff and draw inferences from that evidence that the defendant's explanation for its action was false. The Court held that, in this case, Mr. Reeves had presented evidence to provide a reasonable jury a basis to believe Sanderson's justification for the termination was false. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc, 2000 WL 743663 (U.S. June 12, 2000)
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