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Negligence/Exclusion of Expert Testimony:
In Hawkins v. D.C.,
the D.C. Superior Court, Burnett, J. decided that there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to find gross negligence against the District
of Columbia with respect to the wrongful death of two motorists
killed by an individual who was being chased by D.C. police officers.
The Court held that the finding of gross negligence was supported
by the fact that the police officers were pursuing the suspect
through a residential neighborhood at 70-80 mph, continued the
high speed pursuit while approaching a busy intersection at rush
hour, and failed to break off the pursuit. The Court did, however,
order the jury verdict of $5,997,751.77 reduced to $2,225,598.77
on the grounds that the "expert" testimony offered by
the plaintiff's economic expert to the effect that the minor decedent
(8 year old) "who was deemed by some to be a bright boy"
would have graduated from college was too speculative. The economic
expert's testimony with respect to several other components of
damages, including loss of maternal services to surviving children
was also held to be too vague.
Contributory Negligence:
The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held in O'Connor v. D.C., et al.,
that a pedestrian who fails to look (at least briefly) to see
if there is oncoming traffic before stepping into a busy street
at rush hour is negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff testified
that she had not checked the traffic signal before stepping into
the street, nor had she looked to see oncoming traffic. The Court
held that under these facts, even if there was a sufficient basis
for finding that the District of Columbia was negligent in allowing
the puddle to accumulate the, plaintiff's actions constituted
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and barred any recovery
by the Plaintiff.
Insurance/Notice:
In CSX Transportation, Inc.
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that an insured on an excess liability
policy has a duty to notify his insurance company of a claim when
a "reasonable insured knowing everything the insured knows
or should have known would give notice." The Court explained
this standard as taking into account the plaintiff's past experience
with claims, and whether or not lawsuits directed against the
plaintiff were usually settled for "pennies on the dollar,"
and thus, under an amount which would implicate the excess policy.
Damages/Contribution:
In Berg, et al. v. Footer,
the D.C. Court of Appeals held that an uncontested stipulation
setting a defendant's liability, made the defendant a joint tortfeasor
for determining allowable credit to a non-settling defendant against
whom a jury awarded full damages. The Court determined that
the plaintiff should receive a pro rata credit, rather than a
pro tanto credit, even where the Plaintiff's recovery exceeds
the amount of the verdict.
Defamation:
In Washington v. Smith, et
al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided
that a defendant was entitled to summary judgment in its favor
where the plaintiff could not show that the opinion of a basketball
coach published in a sports magazine was "objectively verifiable"
and false, nor supported by the facts. The Court stated that
on opinions expressed in the magazine article concerning a basketball
coach's ability to "screw things up" were vague and
not "objectively verifiable," and as such, were not
actionable in defamation.
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Negligence/Duty:
In N.O.L. v. D.C., the D.C. Court of Appeals held that
a hospital has no duty to disclose to a husband his wife's HIV-positive
test results in light of D.C. Code § 6-2805, which specifically
protects such results from disclosure to third parties. The plaintiff
had contended that the hospital's failure to disclose the positive
test results to him constituted negligent infliction of emotional
distress when the condition was finally made known to him some
time later. The Court held that contrary to the plaintiff's assertion
of the existence of a duty to inform him, the hospital actually
had a duty not to inform him without his wife's
written consent under D.C. Code § 6-117 (b)(1).
Amendment of Pleadings/Statute of
Limitations:
In Arrington v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Court of
Appeals held that when a plaintiff Amended a Complaint which changed
the name of the Defendant from D.C. General Hospital to the District
of Columbia, the change constituted a change of party under Superior
Court Rule 15(c) and did not relate back to the time of filing
so as to bring the Complaint within the applicable statute of
limitations. The Court held that the question of whether an amended
pleading relates back to the date of filing for statute of limitations
purposes involves a two-step process. The Court must decide whether
the amendment "changed the party," i.e., whether the
amendment merely corrects a misnomer or actually adds a new party.
If the amendment actually names a new party, it relates back
to the date of filing only notice requirements are met. The Court
held that the amendment in this case added a new party which had
not received proper notice under D.C. Superior Court Rules, and,
therefore, dismissed the action on statute of limitations grounds.
Insurance/Underinsured Motorists:
In Thomas v. Abu-Ghannon, et al., the Superior Court held
that the set-off provisions of an underinsured motorist policy
do not cover the salary paid to a park policeman who was injured
in an accident prior to his retirement on disability, nor to the
retirement benefits he later received. GEICO, the underinsured
motorist carried claimed that it was entitled under the policy
language to a set-off and reductions for the workers' compensation
and wage payments received by its insured which essentially extinguished
the underinsured motorist claim. While all parties agreed that
GEICO was entitled to a set-off for the workers' compensation
payments received, the Court held that the salary paid to the
plaintiff during a period of disability was not "disability
benefit," and that GEICO was not entitled to a set-off for
these amounts. The Court also declined to bring retirement benefits
under the ambit of the policy language and apply those amounts
as a set-off.
Product Liability/Design Defect:
In Ferguson, et ux. v. Winkler GMBH & Co., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that where a manufacturer
provided warning labels against removing a panel on bakery equipment
without first stopping the machine, a plaintiff who reached into
the equipment was not able to demonstrate that the machine had
been sold in an unreasonably dangerous condition. The Court found
that the plaintiff had not shown "significantly probative"
evidence that the design of the machine contemplated workers reaching
into the particular part of the machinery involved, and that the
manufacturer provided a large warning label against reaching into
the moving machinery. The Court thus found that both the design
and warnings of the machinery were adequate and reversed the District
Court's finding of liability.
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