|
Business Law/Insurance Law:
In Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland v. The
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, June 28, 1996,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined that prior undisclosed
health conditions that have manifested themselves before a policy
holder buys a disability income insurance policy are not a basis
under which an insurer can avoid coverage. In interpreting Md.
Ann. Code art. 48A Section 441 (1957, 1994 Repl. Vol.), the Court
refused to recognize an 'exist/manifest' distinction regarding
prior health conditions, and found that the Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York (MONY) could not refuse the claim of its,
insured/ Mary L. Holland, on the ground that her condition manifested
itself before the issuance of her policy. Based upon the language
of the statute, the Court concluded that, after the incontestability
period expired, the insurer could not deny a claim for a disability
that commenced two year's after the policy's inception, regardless
of whether the condition existed or manifested itself before the
policy was issued.
Tort Law/Proximate Cause:
In Deborah Yonce, Individually, etc. et al. v. SmithKline
Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., et al., June 28,
1996, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined that
the circuit court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motion
on the issue of whether the defendant's negligence proximately
caused the injury at issue, was in error. The case involved the
premature births and untimely deaths of identical twins born to
the appellants. Based on the facts of the case, the Court found
that there was legally sufficient evidence to permit a factfinder
to conclude that the defendant's negligent act, the destruction
of a medical sample, was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury because the negligent act was not too far removed from
the harm, the nature of the harm was foreseeable, and the injured
party was a member of a class for whom such injury was foreseeable.
Business Law/Workers' Compensation:
In Hub Labels, Inc. et al. v. Alvin A. Craig III,
June 28, 1996, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined
a jury should decide whether a weekly job duty is usual or unusual
in determining whether a worker is entitled to workers' compensation
benefits.
|
The appellee's injury to his back occurred when he lifted
a 10,000 foot roll of labels to load the printing machine which
he operated. The Court believed that the case turned on whether
such heavy lifting was a "usual" incident of his employment
or an "unusual" one, and concluded that it was within
the jury's factfinding duties to make this determination.
Business Law/Insurance Law:
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., et al v. Sherwood
Brands, Inc., June 27, 1996, the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals held that an insurer need not pay attorney's
fees that were incurred by the insured prior to the insurer receiving
notice of a pending suit, even where it was unable to show it
was prejudiced by its insured's failure to notify it promptly
of a pending suit. According to the facts of the case, the insurance
company first received notice of the litigation pending against
their insured, on June 18, 1991. The Court determined that the
insurance company was not obligated to pay for Sherwood's attorney's
fees incurred before the date of notice.
Business Law/Insurance Law:
In Woodfin Equities Corp. et al. v. Hartford Mutual Insurance
Company, June 27, 1996, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals held that a judgement obtained in an incorrect name, but
ostensibly against the insured is nonetheless effective against
the correct party. The Court reasoned that the appellee was correct
in their assertion that before an injured party may maintain a
direct action against an insurer, the injured party must obtain
a judgment against the insured, and that judgment must be returned
unsatisfied or the insured must refuse to pay the judgment. However,
the Court did not agree with the appellee's conclusion that because
the default judgment was obtained against Deerfield, Inc. rather
than Deerfield Engineering, Inc., that a default judgment was
not obtained against the insured. "Since this is a misnomer
situation, the insured could not legally avoid the default judgment
on the technical ground that the judgment is in the incorrect
name."
|
