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Recent Developments in the Law |
Vol. No. XIV
October 13, 1997
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Tort Law:
Kathryn M. Rowe, the Maryland Attorney General, responding to a legislative query initiated by State Senator Donald Munson, R-Washington, has issued an advisory opinion on the application of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act to five scenarios involving lead paint poisoning. In the first situation, a person at risk obtains a result of 15 micrograms/liter of blood in a first blood test taken prior to the actıs effective date. After the effective date, the same person is found to have a reading of 26 micrograms and reports the elevated lead/blood level to his or her landlord. The attorney general found that the person could not sue until the property owner had been notified and given an opportunity to make a qualified offer of a capped fee to cover the costs of relocation and medical treatment. If the owner made a qualified offer it would cut off the ability of the exposed person to file suit. In the second scenario, a person tested at 25 micrograms prior to the acts effective date tests at 26 micrograms after the date and reports the finding to the landlord. The attorney general said the act was intended to cover all exposure to lead that
occurred after the effective date and that therefore, the posited exposure was covered. In the third instance, a person is measured at 15 micrograms prior to the effective date and 19 micrograms after the effective date, a result that is reported to the property owner. According to the attorney general, the act has no retroactive effect here because there was no lead/blood level of 25 micrograms or greater first reported after the act became effective. Also, to the extent the exposure after the effective date is involved, a person at risk would have neither a cause of action or the right to receive a qualified, capped offer from the landlord. In the fourth scenario, a person at risk gives a 19 microgram reading after the effective date and reports it to the landlord. The act presumes that elevated blood/lead levels documented in the first 30 days of residence occurred prior to the residency. That prior exposure could be grounds for a civil suit. In the final hypothetical situation, a person gets a 26 microgram reading prior to the actıs effective date. After the effective date the person tests at 15 micrograms. The attorney general said the person would not be subject to the actıs retroactivity provisions because the lead exposure was documented prior to the effective date. The person could, however, accept a qualified offer from the landlord. If the person did not accept that offer, he or she could file a civil action with respect to the exposure that occurred before the effective date.
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Medical Malpractice:
In Lasley v. Georgetown University, Feb. 6, 1997, the D.C.
Court of Appeals ruled that expert testimony is required to prove causation in m
edical malpractice cases where injury occurred during medical procedure itself b
ecause juries have no basis to decide which of the possible causes was actually
responsible for the injury. Appellant Michael A. Lasley was diagnosed with a congenital arteriovenous malformation (AVM) in the left anterior of his brain. This abnormal tangle of fragile blood vessels poses a serious health threat because the vessels are easily rupturable and, if broken, could lead to cerebral hemorrhaging that causes brain damage and leads to death. Dr. Deveikis treated Lasleyıs AVM by embolizing it. During the embolizing procedure an artery ruptured that caused a severe intracerebral hematoma. An emergency operation performed by Dr. Luessenhop removed the hematoma and the AVM, but Lasley sustained injuries that included speech difficulty and right side weakness. Lasley filed a negligence claim against both doctors. In his complaint, Lasley premised his claim on the negligent failure of Drs. Luessenhop and Deveikis to obtain Lasleyıs informed consent. Lasley, however, did not claim that the doctors were negligent while performing the procedure, only that they did not properly advise him of the risks of the embolization procedure. Lasley asserted that despite consenting to the procedure, he would have withheld his consent had the doctors fully explained to him the risks and alternatives. The D.C. Court of Appeals found that a claim of uninformed consent requires a proof of causation. In their eyes, Lasley failed to demonstrate a causal relation between the physicianıs failure to disclose the material information and the injury he sustained. Proof of causation normally requires an expert medical opinion and Lasley provided none. An expert opinion is needed in complicated medical cases to avoid jury findings based on mere speculation. An average jury is unskilled in the field of medicine and it would be an injustice for them to decide the cause of a brain embolism without first learning from an expert. As mentioned, Lasley failed to present an expert to explain that his injuries were sustained from the doctorıs procedure rather than the original AVM illness.
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Insurance Law:
In Theresa A. Kimmel v. SAFECO Insurance Co., filed July 2, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals decided the issue of whether or not an insurance policy holder could be barred from further recovery if payment labeled as full and final was accepted. Theresa A. Kimmel suffered injuries from an automobile accident and she accumulated over $70,000 in medical expenses. When SAFECO, her insurance company, sent her a check for only $20,000, she signed the acceptance thinking she was receiving only partial payment. Because Ms. Kimmel signed a check that read ³full and final payment of all claims² SAFECO contended they owed her nothing. The Court of Special Appeals agreed. Judge Hollander found that when a claim is disputed, acceptance of payment, coupled with knowledge that payment is intended fully to satisfy the disputed claim, constitutes a satisfaction that warrants no further recovery.
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Gross Negligence:
In District of Columbia v. Walker, Feb. 6, 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that evidence of a high speed police chase of a juvenile in a stolen car did not support a gross negligence claim required in a suit against the District of Columbia. A juvenile driving a stolen car was pursued by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers through D.C. and into Maryland via the Suitland Parkway where the juvenile collided with another car and killed the driver, Terry Walker. Mrs. Walkerıs husband, William Walker, sued the District under Marylandıs wrongful death and survival statutes, alleging gross negligence in the MPD officersı pursuit of the stolen car and negligence in the MPDıs training of the officers regarding proper pursuit procedures. The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Walker on both claims. On appeal, the District made two arguments. First, the District argued that, as a matter of law, the MPD officersı conduct did not amount to gross negligence, and therefore the District cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from the pursuit. Second, the District argued that, since it cannot be held directly liable for the collision based on the conduct of the MPD officers involved in the pursuit unless that conduct was grossly negligent, liability cannot be indirectly imposed based on the officerıs training. The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed on both issues. Based on the evidence provided, the Court of Appeals did not think that a reasonable juror could find that, in the circumstances, the relevant conduct resulting in the collision amounted to such an extreme deviation from the reasonable standard of care as to constitute gross negligence on the part of the MPD officers. Additionally, since the Court of Appeals found that the MPD officers did not act in gross negligence it does not follow that those responsible for training the MPD officers involved in the chase acted in any way negligent.
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Damages, Future Earnings Loss:
In John Anderson et al. v. Montieth Litzenberg, filed May 28, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ruled that a self-employed plaintiff is not precluded from recovering for his lost ability to earn money in his business solely because the business in which he is engaged has not yet demonstrated a history of profitability. Additionally, a self-employed plaintiff is entitled to introduce evidence of his earning capacity in that business. Montieth Litzenberg, appellee, filed suit against John Anderson, David A. Bramble Inc., and Cramaro Tarpaulin Systems, Inc., for injuries he sustained in a traffic accident. A jury in the Circuit Court for Cecil County awarded appellee $349,400, including $213,000 for lost earning capacity. Appealing to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, John Anderson and David A. Bramble Inc., and Cramaro Inc. asked the court to review several questions including: 1. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence as to the costs of hiring a replacement to perform work that appellee had personally performed prior to the accident? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying a motion for New Trial in regards to the future loss of earning capacity award? The appellants contend that one cannot recover future profits from a business that has not demonstrated an ability to make consistent profits in the past. In disagreement, the Court of Special Appeals found that when an accident victim is in business for himself, loss of profits is essentially an element of loss of earnings from personal services and, therefore, is used as an aid in calculating damages for impairment of earning capacity. Concluding, the Court of Special Appeals stated that because impairment of earning capacity is not measured by what the claimant actually earned, it follows that a plaintiff can recover for impairment of earning capacity without establishing a prior track record of earnings.
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Intentional Torts/Assault and Battery:
In Juvenal R. Goicochea v. John A. Langworthy, filed May 6, 1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed John Langworthyıs law suit against Dr. Goicochea finding that his claim against the doctor fell under the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. Langworthy alleged the doctor injured him during a routine hernia examination. According to Langworthy, Dr. Goicochea pressed too hard against his groin area causing chronic pain and swelling. Langworthy first filed a medical malpractice complaint with HCAO, but failed to attach a qualified expertıs certificate stating that Dr. Goicochea varied from the normal standards of care. Because of this, HCAO dismissed his claim. Langworthy also filed a claim in Circuit Court, seeking punitive and compensatory damages. Dr. Goicochea asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit because state law required HCAO to handle the issue. Since HCAO dismissed the claim, the doctor argued it was not in the circuit courtıs jurisdiction. The court agree and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reaffirmed the circuit courtıs decision because Langworthyıs allegations were insufficient to remove the claim from the coverage of the health care law, because he failed to specify any factual basis to show the doctorıs exam lacked medical validity.
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Tort Law:
In Montgomery Cablevision Limited Partnership, et al v. Julian D. Beynon, filed July 3, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that crash victims cannot collect damages for pre-impact fright when they die instantaneously. A jury awarded the deceased driver and his surviving parents almost $4 million, which was ultimately reduced to $650,000 by the trial judge. On review, the appeals Court vacated the juryıs pre-impact fright damages.
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Products Liability:
In NCR Corp. v. Eula Davis, et al., filed July 21, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed a jury verdict that awarded damages to a supermarket clerk for repetitive stress injuries arising from the use of price scanners on the basis that the evidence produced was insufficient to establish a link between scanning and tennis elbow. The Court focused on the expert testimony of the surgeon who testified on the Plaintiffıs behalf, noting that he provided no scientific or medical studies that showed a correlation between working with a supermarket scanner and elbow disorders.
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Torts/Parent-Child Immunity:
In James K. Eagan, Guardian of the Property and Next of Friend of Laura M. Calhoun and Kevin J. Calhoun, Minors v. John C. Calhoun, filed Aug. 26, 1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the parent-child immunity doctrine could not be used to protect a parent from a wrongful death suit where the parent has been found guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter. John Calhoun pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter of his wife and his childrens' guardian filed a civil action against him for damages due to the emotional pain and suffering to the children. Based on the intentional nature of Mr. Calhoun's act of killing his wife, the high court found that the Mahnke exception to the parent-child immunity should apply. In Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951), the court held that a minor child who has suffered from cruel, inhuman, or outrageous conduct at the hands of a parent may bring suit for monetary damages.
Insurance Law/Duty to Defend:
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., filed Aug. 29, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, held that a insurance policyholder was entitled to have its carrier defend asbestos-related health claims filed against it. Porter Hayden Co. sells and installs insulation. Until the 1970s their installation contained asbestos, and as a result thousands of asbestos-related law suits were filed against the company. Commercial Union Insurance Co., one of Porter Hayden's insurers, denied any obligation to defend or indemnify Porter Hayden, and Porter Hayden filed a declaratory judgment seeking a court's declaration of coverage. The circuit court declared there was coverage, the appeals court affirmed, and Commercial Union appealed. Since this time the case traveled back to the trial court and back up to the Court of Special Appeals, where Commercial Union argued that with respect to their summary judgment ruling, the lower court had failed to conduct further evidentiary proceedings and additionally had erred in not finding that Porter Hayden's suit was time-barred. Finding in favor of coverage, the Court found that when the suit for the underlying breach of an insurance contract to defend and possibly indemnify would not be time barred, neither will an action seeking a declaratory judgment on coverage.
Insurance Law:
In Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company et al., filed Aug. 26, 1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed thirty (30) years of Maryland coverage law in the Sherwood decision which holds that an insurer is liable for pre-notice attorneys fees and costs incurred in the defense of a lawsuit when (1) the insuredıs delay in giving notice is unintentional and in good faith, (2) the insurer is not prejudiced by the delay, and (3) the fees and costs are reasonable and would have been incurred by the insurer had timely notice been given.
The Court rejected the notion that had previously been the law of Maryland that duty of notification was a condition precedent to the insurerıs obligation to defend or indemnify, and that the lack of any prejudice to the assured from the failure to give prompt notice was immaterial. The Court held that under Section 482 of Article 48A that in order to avoid its duty to defend or indemnify on the ground of delayed notice, the insurer must establish by a preponderance of evidence that the delay in giving notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer. The Court held that the duty to notify is not a condition precedent, but merely a covenant and absent a showing of prejudice. The failure of the assured to notify does not exclude the insurer from complying with its duty to defend. The Court further noted that an insurer must pay for pre-notice legal costs where it is reasonable under the circumstances for the policyholder to incur the expenses and the expenses did not materially exceed the amount the insurer would have incurred had notice been given earlier.
Insurance Law/Sexual Molestation:
In Gloria Pettit, individually, etc. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, filed Sept. 5, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that a liability insurance policy's exclusion for intentional acts covers an adult's sexual contact with children. Gloria Pettit sued James Kowalski for damages as a result of his sexual molestation of her children. Erie Insurance Exchange was Kowalski's insurance carrier and Erie filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that the sexual molestation fell under the intentional injury exclusion. The court agreed, finding that it was undisputed that Kowalski had the intent to molest the children and that he need not have expected or intended that injury would manifest in a particular manner.
Labor Law:
In General Motors Truck and Bus Group et al. v. William O. Campion Jr., filed Sept. 11, 1997, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling that an employee's injuries, sustained on the job as a result of an assault by another employee, arose out of an in the course of employment. Campion was working on an assembly line and instigated a discussion with a fellow employee about work that had not been done properly. The other worker started to beat Campion and claimed that Campion had used racial epithets and hit him. Campion denied these allegations and said that he was walking away when the other worker started to hit him from behind. Due to these discrepancies, the Workers' Compensation Commission found that Campion's injuries were due to his own willful misconduct and denied his claim. The circuit court judge disagreed and found that Campion's injuries occurred out of an in the course of employment and were not due to his own willful misconduct. Following established principals of judicial review, the appeals court did not want to second guess the circuit court's decision and affirmed.
Expert Witness:
In White v. Hairston, July 31, 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff's treating physician should be allowed to testify both as a fact witness and as an expert witness, despite the rule that the same person may not testify both as an expert and as a fact witness in the same proceeding. Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862 (D.C. 1983). The D.C. Court of Appeals recently overruled Beach, concluding that it should be left to the trial court's discretion whether the danger of jury confusion can be guarded against through the use of less harsh methods than exclusion of the dual testimony. In light of this decision the court found that in the present case it was appropriate to remand the case to determine if lesser measures than exclusion could be applied.
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Notice of Claim:
In Doe v. District of Columbia, June 19, 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff, Jane Doe, had failed to satisfy the notice requirements of D.C. Code s 12-309. The plaintiff, Jane Doe, contended that the police report that was filed provided the District of Columbia with adequate notice of her claim against the District. Section 12-309 does provide for notice through a police report, however, the court noted that in order for the report to provide sufficient notice, it must contain the same information that is required in any other notice given under the statute - approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. The purpose of the notice is to provide information upon which the District could anticipate that a claim against it might arise. While notice requirements are generally construed liberally and in favor of compliance, the court found that this was not a close call. The notice statute contains no exception to the time limit and therefore Jane Doe's action against the District was time barred.
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Insurance/Uninsured Motorist Coverage:
In Sigridur E. Harris et vir. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., filed Sept. 2, 1997, the Court of Special Appeals held that a woman mugged by a man while in a moving car, was entitled to coverage for her injuries under her uninsured/underinsured motorist policy. Initially Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. refused payment to their insured on the basis that the policy did not cover injuries from this type of incident because it was an intentional act. The Court reasoned, however, that Maryland's uninsured motorist statute requires coverage to extend to injuries resulting from intentional and unintentional incidents. The Court went on to find that Harris' injuries constituted an accident under her policy, and that her injuries arose from the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
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Torts/Medical Malpractice:
In The Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Travis Pepper et al., filed Aug. 22, 1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals held even though a parent's claim was time-barred, in certain circumstances, a court should be able to consider the parents' inability to pay for a child's medical expenses. Travis Pepper and his parents instituted a suit against Johns Hopkins Hospital based on negligence. The trial court held that Travis's parent's suit was time-barred, and excluded any evidence concerning medical expenses incurred either by Travis Pepper or his parents. However, because it was probable due to his parents' financial standing, that Travis would be forced to pay for his medical expenses, this Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals' decision to remand the case for a new trial on damages. The Court relied on Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 631 A.2d 429 (1993), which provided that if a minor child can show that he or his estate either has paid or will be individually responsible to pay for medical expenses: (1) by emancipation, (2) by death or incompetence of his parents, (3) as necessaries for which his parents are unable or unwilling to pay, or (4) by operation of statute, then the minor is entitled to bring a claim for those medical expenses, despite the running of the limitations.
Torts/Parent-Child Immunity:
In Natasha Renko v. Teresa Kaylor McLean, filed July 30,1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that based on the underlying facts of the case, there was no compelling reason to create an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine to allow emancipated children to file actions against their parents for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents occurring in minority. While seventeen, Renko sustained serious injuries when her mother drove a car they were both occupying into the rear of another vehicle. After she turned eighteen, Renko sued her mother and her mother's husband for negligence. Renko argued that since Maryland case law permits adult children to maintain actions against their parents for acts occurring after the child reaches the age of minority, adult children should be able to sue their parents for wrongful acts that occur during minority. The Court rejected this logic, stating such lawsuits would surely be detrimental to family peace and harmony.
Tort Law:
In Eugene Holzhauer v. Saks & Co. and Montgomery Elevator, filed July 25, 1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to an escalator case because the plaintiff had failed to show that the type of accident that took place doesn't normally occur absent negligence and that the escalator was in the exclusive control of the defendant. After sustaining injuries when an escalator upon which he was riding came to a sudden stop and caused him to fall, Holzhauer filed suit against Saks & Co. and the owner of the escalator, Montgomery Elevator Company. The Court reasoned that in order to show that res ipsa loquitur applied, Holzhauer was required to first prove that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of negligence by both parties. He was unable to do so because there was an equally likely explanation for the escalator's abrupt stop because the escalator would also stop whenever any person pushed one of the emergency stop buttons. Additionally, he could not show that the escalator was in the exclusive control of the defendant because hundreds of Saksı customers have unlimited access to the emergency stop buttons each day. And finally, res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable here because the common knowledge of the jurors would not be sufficient to support an inference or finding of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Torts/Trespassing:
In JBG/Twinbrook Metro Limited Partnership v. Bobby Joe Wheeler et al., filed Aug. 6, 1997, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of assumption of risk did not bar recovery for trespass. JBG owned property which abutted property owned by Bobby Joe Wheeler. Bobby Joe maintained a gas station on the property and JBG filed an action against Bobby Joe et al for the cost of abating environmental hazards on its property resulting from gasoline which had leaked from underground storage tanks. The action was based on section EN §4-409(a), as well as common law trespass, negligence and nuisance. A jury found violations of EN §4-409(a), but that since JBG had purchased the property with full understanding and
knowledge, they had voluntarily assumed the risk of contamination and therefore the trespass action was barred. On appeal, this Court found that EN §4-409(a) only applied to a spillage from a vessel, ship or boat, and therefore was inapplicable to this matter. However, rejecting the application of assumption of risk as a defense to a trespass claim, the Court reversed the judgment in favor of Bobby Joe and remanded for the assessment of damages.
Contributory Negligence:
In Burns, et ux. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, May 27, 1997 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, found that a ruling of a bus driver's contributorily negligence for failing to see oncoming traffic when he started a left turn based on the evidence. During the trial, the driver testified that although he had an unobstructed view, he did not see the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiffs claimed that such a failure clearly constituted contributory negligence. However, this Court found that the District's "failure to see" doctrine was inapplicable in this case because under the doctrine the driver must fail to look effectively and see an approaching automobile as an immediate hazard. At the time of the bus driver's turn, the plaintiff's vehicle was not an immediate hazard because the driver had testified that he could see only approximately 200 feet down the road, and therefore he could not have seen the plaintiff's car when he started his turn. In light of the time of the day, lack of visibility and speed of the plaintiff's driving and the time lapse between the time the turn was made and the impact, it would reasonable for a jury to find that the bus driver did not improperly fail to see the plaintiff's vehicle.
Products Liability/Lead Paint:
In Colbert, et al. v. CCHL Investments, Inc., et al., Oct. 30, 1996, the D.C. Superior Court granted a summary judgment to the landlord finding that real property and products associated with it cannot be considered products. Ms. Colbert lived in a property owned by CCHL and managed by WBRC. CCHL sued Ms. Colbert for unpaid rent, and Ms. Colbert counter-claimed for a number of housing code violations. A settlement agreement was entered into. However, shortly thereafter, Ms. Colbert brought suit against CCHL, alleging that her son was lead poisoned as a result of exposure to lead based paint in the apartment. CCHL argued that the settlement agreement barred this action because it released "any and all claims arising out of . . . . the existence of lead paint and poisoning on the premises, through this date,² and it is impossible to separate the alleged injury into that occurring before the time the agreement was signed and after. The Court found, however, that based on a plain reading of the release, the agreement clearly contemplated that claims could be brought for lead injuries occurring after the date of the agreement. CCHL further argued that it had no notice of chipping or peeling of the paint, and therefore had no opportunity to take corrective measures. The .Court found however, that without rendering a landlord an insurer of his tenantsı property - a jury could conclude that CCHL knew or should have known that Ms. Colbertıs son was testing positive for lead. In addition, the Court also found that there was a genuine dispute as to material facts regarding the breach of implied warranty of habitability and violations of the Lead-based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, but granted CCHLıs motion for summary judgment on the issues of strict products liability, nuisance and intentional tort.
Negligence/Contribution:
In District of Columbia v. Shannon, June 26, 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed a juryıs award of $550,000 to the plaintiff to compensate her individually and as next friend for the loss of her daughterıs thumb in a playground accident. The Plaintiff sued the District of Columbia, among other entities, and prior to trial, settled with the other entities. The District of Columbia appealed the juryıs award on several grounds including whether the trial court erred in denying the Districtıs request for special interrogatories concerning the negligence of the entities that the Plaintiff settled with. The District argued that for purposes of obtaining credits for the settlements against the verdict, the district should have been allowed to argue inferences from the evidence presented that these entities, the manufacturer and installer, were jointly responsible for the childıs injuries, and that the jury should have resolved the settling partiesı negligence by answering special interrogatories addressed to that issue. The Plaintiff countered that the Districtıs failure to raise this issue until the end of the trial did not provide adequate notice of the issue, and did not grant her an opportunity to establish a record as to this issue. The Court agreed the District provided insufficient notice regarding the credit issue in its pretrial statement, and that the first day of trial was too late to provide sufficient notice to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court determined that a defendant will have to assert a right to a pro rata credit either through the traditional means of a cross-claim for contribution, or by asserting it explicitly as a defense or set off in the pretrial order, or as a request for special interrogatories to the jury as soon as a settlement occurs during trial.
Workersı Compensation/Traveling Employee:
In Kolson v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Services, Aug. 7, 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals determined that a bus driver who had checked in his bus and was walking toward employer provided accommodations when he was assaulted, did sustain injuries that arose in the course of his employment. Consequently, he was entitled to workersı compensation benefits. The hearing examiner initially rejected the bus driverıs traveling employee exception claim, finding that he had just completed the performance of his duties as a bus driver and was free to go home at the time that he sustained his injuries. This Court, however, found that the occurrence fell within the exception, noting that there is a presumption that a claim comes within the provisions of the Workersı Compensation Act.
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